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Executive Summary 
Performance-based Services Acquisition (PBSA) is the government’s preferred approach 
to purchasing services (National Defense Authorization, 2000, § 821).  These contracts 
specify the government’s desired end result without stipulating "how" a task should be 
performed, granting contractors the flexibility to complete its tasks in the manner the firm 
deems most appropriate.  This method runs counter to traditional government contracts 
that explicitly state the processes a contractor must complete in order to perform the task 
in accordance with the contractual agreement (which is “input oriented,” i.e., compliance 
oriented, vs. “output oriented,” i.e., results oriented).  If implemented correctly, PBSA 
will allow the Department of Defense (DoDIG) to attain better performance at lower cost 
in its services acquisitions than the DoD currently achieves. 
Since fiscal year (FY) 2000, the DoD has spent an average of 56% of its budget on the 
acquisition of services, including research and development activities, compared to 39% 
during the 1980s (U.S. General Services Administration 2009).  In FY 2009, the DoD 
spent $132 billion on services—an 84% increase since FY 2000 (U.S. General Services 
Administration 2009).  The federal government has significantly increased its purchase of 
services over time as (1) its internal capacity to furnish such services has diminished and 
(2) the DoD’s overall reliance upon services has increased markedly.   
The Federal Acquisition Regulation defines a services acquisition contract as an 
agreement that “directly engages the time and effort of a contractor whose primary 
purpose is to perform an identifiable task rather than to furnish an end item of supply” 
and defines a performance-based contract as “structured around the results to be achieved 
as opposed to the manner by which the work is to be performed” (FAR, 2010, 37.101).  
The DoD has further acknowledged that four elements are required for an acquisition to 
be performance-based: (1) a performance work statement, describing the requirement as a 
measurable outcome; (2) measurable performance standards, defining acceptable 
outcomes and determining if performance thresholds have been achieved; (3) remedies, 
the incentives and penalties used to provide incentives for performance; and (4) a 
performance assessment plan, detailing performance metrics and how the contractor will 
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be evaluated (Gansler, 2000).  Overall, significant differences exist between 
performance-based contracting and the DoD’s traditional contracting method.   
PBSA has been the government’s preferred approach to service contracting since the 
Office of Federal Procurement Policy issued policy letter 91-2, entitled Service 
Contracting, on April 15, 1991.  These guidelines for PBSA service contracting were 
incorporated in Part 37 of the FAR in 1997, which provides the DoD with its current 
instructions for use of service contracts. 
When compared to the traditional contracting method, PBSA offers potential benefits 
including higher performance, lower cost, increased competition and innovation, greater 
use of commercial services, more appropriate risk-sharing between government and 
contractor, less program risk, higher likelihood of completing projects successfully, more 
effective oversight, and greater contractor-government cooperation.   
The DoD faces several challenges to implementing PBSA, including the perception that 
the government will have less control over the contractor, the questionable applicability 
of PBSA to certain programs, and PBSA’s heavy reliance upon selecting simple yet 
effective metrics.  
A consensus does not exist regarding (1) how fully PBSA has been implemented and (2) 
if programs that have implemented PBSA have achieved their intended results. 
The report explores two case studies, Performance-Based Logistics (PBL) and the Navy 
Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI).  The PBL case study reveals the potential benefits the 
DoD could reap from wider use of PBSA contracts.  NMCI shows that performance 
metrics must reflect achievable performance levels for them to be effective, and that the 
services acquisition workforce must be involved in evaluating performance throughout 
the length of the contract.  
As a result of our research we found that,  
(1) the DoD needs to acquire services more effectively;  
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(2) the DoD’s acquisition workforce lacks training and experience in services 
contracting;  
(3) selecting correct metrics and contract incentives is paramount;  
(4) PBSA requires competition for it to be effective;  
(5) post-award contract management needs greater attention;  
(6) more data and research is needed on PBSA; and  
(7) multiple barriers exist to correctly implementing PBSA in the DoD—including 
cultural resistance from the bureaucracy, regulatory barriers, budgetary obstacles, 
workforce limitations, inexperience with performance-based contracting, and 
governance issues.  
Based on these conclusions, we believe that the DoD must improve the DoD’s 
Implementation of Performance-based Services Acquisition in the following 
recommended ways:  
(1) the USD(AT&L) must continue to reinforce the Department’s commitment to 
PBSA; 
(2) the USD(AT&L) should work to ensure programs maximize communication 
between government program personnel and service industry representatives;   
(3) the USD(AT&L) should provide clear guidance to the acquisition workforce on 
the appropriate contract structures for the different types of services;   
(4) for the different categories of services, the DoD and military Services should 
develop standards, definitions, and performance metrics; and  
(5) further research on the extent of PBSA use and how best to implement PBSA is 
required.   
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In addition, the DoD must improve the capabilities of the acquisition workforce 
performing services contracting in the following ways: 
(1) actively recruit experienced services acquisition personnel from the private sector; 
(2) improve the training of government services acquisition personnel; and  
(3) the USD(AT&L) should incentivize the existing workforce focused on the 






The Department of Defense (DoD) faces an uncertain fiscal future due to declining 
government tax revenue and increasing, mandatory entitlement spending.  Demands on 
the civilian and military defense workforce remain very high, with conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan absorbing much of the DoD’s money, manpower, and funding priorities.  
With projected budget cuts on the horizon, the DoD needs to learn how to do more while 
spending less.  One potential source of untapped savings in the DoD’s budget is service 
acquisitions, which consume over 50% of the DoD’s total spending.  In order to realize 
greater savings, the DoD should expand its use of Performance-based Services 
Acquisition (PBSA).  The government has already made PBSA its preferred approach to 
purchasing services, but successful DoD-wide implementation of PBSA remains elusive. 
PBSA contracts are intended to leverage the private sector’s capacity for innovation. 
They specify the government’s desired end result without specifying "how" a task should 
be performed, granting contractors the flexibility to complete required tasks in the 
manner the contractor believes to be most effective.  This approach runs counter to the 
government’s more traditional approach to contracting (referred to as compliance 
contracting or regulatory contracting) which explicitly specifies the detailed processes 
that a contractor must complete in order to perform the task (and frequently drives up the 
cost of the effort).  If implemented correctly, PBSA enables contractors to implement 
what they believe to be the best solution, giving the DoD better performance at lower cost 
in its acquisition of services.  Savings from PBSA can be both explicit—paying less for 
services—and implicit—saving money through better performance, such as when 
contractors responsible for aircraft maintenance reduce maintenance costs by using high-
quality spare parts that need to be serviced less frequently.  Moreover, implementation of 
PBSA would help the DoD to overcome the limitations of the current contracting 
structure, which has been criticized for limiting innovation and competition, while 
making the government responsible for a disproportionate amount of program risk.  
Given the projected budgeting challenges in the future, the DoD must use its resources 
more effectively to remain the most potent military force in the world.  Greater use of 
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PBSA, if implemented correctly, is one strategy that can achieve improved performance 
while reducing cost.   
The DoD’s Acquisition of Services  
The DoD contracts for a large variety of services, ranging from building maintenance to 
weapons design, healthcare, education, transportation, and food services.  The FAR 
(2010) defines a contract for services as an agreement “that directly engages the time and 
effort of a contractor whose primary purpose is to perform an identifiable task rather than 
to furnish an end item of supply” (Department of Defense 2009).   
The DoD’s acquisition of services represents a large and growing portion of the nation’s 
defense expenditures, about $200 billion or over 50% of the DoD’s FY 2009 acquisition 
budget (Government Accountability Office 2009).  As a result, the efficient acquisition of 
services is of utmost importance.  Since FY 2000, the DoD has spent an average of 56% 
of its budget on the acquisition of services, including research and development activities, 
compared to its average expenditures of 39% during the 1980s (U.S. General Services 
Administration 2009).  Expenditures on services increased 84% between FYs 2000 and 
2009 (U.S. General Services Administration 2009).  Over the same period, the DoD’s 
acquisition of services excluding research and development, grew even faster—at a rate 
of 152%.  Today, 75% of the DoD’s services acquisition budget acquires non-R&D 
services, up from 66% during the 1980s (U.S. General Services Administration 2009).   
At the same time, there is growing concern that the DoD's current acquisition of services 
is not as efficient as it could be.  Critics point to growing numbers of “undefinitized 
contracts,” large numbers of cost-based contracts, the lack of adequate metrics, a general 
lack of coordinated procurement of services, and a lack of confidence that the DoD is 
optimizing the value received from these contracts (House of Representatives Committee 
on Armed Services 2009).  It is difficult to gauge the importance of these issues in 
services acquisition because the federal government generally (and the DoD in 
particular), collects very little data related to services acquisition contracts, especially 
data that can be used to evaluate their performance effectiveness and efficiency.   
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Although the DoD’s contracting for services has increased markedly over the past 
decade, there is good reason to believe that the acquisition of services will continue to 
grow as a percentage of the DoD’s total expenditures.  Given the large—and growing—
size of services acquisition, even relatively small increases in efficiencies can produce 
significant savings.  Consequently, improving the implementation of performance-based 
service acquisition is critical to provide necessary military forces with the required 
services effectively and efficiently.
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II. Environmental Challenges for Services Acquisition 
As we enter the second decade of the 21st century, the DoD continues to face several 
challenges to its efficient acquisition of services.  These can be understood best by 
contextualizing competing interests and priorities within their respective environments: 
the federal acquisition environment, and the DoD’s internal acquisition environment.  
Although each has its own unique issues, we believe these concerns are interconnected.  
The federal acquisition environment will force the DoD to achieve improved results with 
fewer resources.  The DoD, which does not have the organic capability to provide many 
of the required services, must partner with the private sector to perform them.  While the 
private sector has much talent and expertise to offer the government, the private sector 
has unique interests and goals that must be aligned with the objectives of the public 
sector.  When those interests are aligned, the contractor works best and provides its best 
value to the government. 
Federal Acquisition Environment 
Support of Contingency Operations 
Military requirements have increased significantly since the start of the 21st century.  The 
terrorist attacks of September 11th and the subsequent military interventions into 
Afghanistan and Iraq have forced defense planners to consider a much wider spectrum of 
potential military scenarios than was considered during the Cold War.  In addition to its 
traditional warfighting role, the U.S. military now actively participates in a wide variety 
of activities, including: peacekeeping, counter-insurgency, humanitarian missions, anti-
piracy, countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and counter-
terrorism.  In order to satisfy these personnel-intensive military requirements with a force 
intentionally structured to improve its tooth-to-tail ratio (resulting in a reduced organic 
capability to provide support services), the DoD has come to rely on private contractors 
to provide combat-support and general-support services both overseas and at home.  For 
instance, over half of the total force structure (well over 150,000 contractors) supporting 
Operation Iraqi Freedom were contractors (House of Representatives Committee on 
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Armed Services 2009).  Thus, the efficient contracting of services is vital to providing 
deployed forces the combat support services required to ensure operational success. 
Fiscal Constraints 
The nation’s financial situation will constrain future defense spending.  Defense spending 
is expected to shrink as mandatory federal  expenditures—particularly Social Security, 
Medicare, Medicaid and interest on the national debt—increase significantly in the near 
future (Congressional Budget Office 2009).  Further, the military’s mandatory costs are 
expected to rise over the long term as it provides healthcare benefits for military 
personnel, retirees, and their dependents, and also replaces worn equipment (Gilmore 
2009).  Budgetary pressure, both within the DoD and across the federal government, will 
reduce the funds available to sustain current systems, as well as to acquire systems 
required in the future.  
Current Focus on In-Sourcing  
Across the federal government, the Obama Administration is pushing to bring many 
contractor provided support services back in-house (i.e., to use federal employees to 
provide these services through so called “in-sourcing”).1  This initiative began in 2006, 
when Congress passed a statute that required the DoD to establish procedures for in-
sourcing (10 U.S.C. § 2463).  In 2008, the Bush Administration promulgated procedures 
that required the DoD to meet certain requirements when in-sourcing, among them was 
the requirement to perform a cost analysis that would determine and account for the “full 
cost of manpower” (Locaria 2010).  In-sourcing received national attention during the 
2008 presidential campaign.  As presidential and vice-presidential candidates, then 
Senators Obama and Biden pledged to “reform federal contracting and reduce the number 
of contractors, saving $40 billion a year” (CNN 2008).  As the in-sourcing initiative 
                                                 
1 For the FY 2011 budget, Defense Secretary Robert Gates is seeking a $79 million hike in civilian pay and 
benefits for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including “$42.6 million from internal in-sourcing 
actions that generate projected savings of $26 million” (Inside Defense, 2010). 
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gained momentum, the Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates, provided greater detail for 
the DoD in a statement explaining the Department’s budget: 
Under this budget request, we will reduce the number of support service 
contractors from our current 39 percent of the workforce to the pre-2001 level of 
26 percent and replace them with full-time government employees.  Our goal is 
to hire as many as 13,000 new civil servants in FY10 to replace contractors and 
up to 30,000 new civil servants in place of contractors over the next five years. 
(Garamone, 2009) 
The rationale for in-sourcing was based on three lines of reasoning.  First, there was a 
concern, particularly with regard to the understaffed acquisition workforce, that 
contractors were performing “inherently governmental” functions.  Second, despite 
evidence to the contrary, there was a strong, intuitive belief that government employees 
could perform many of the contracted services at a lower cost than the private sector.  
Third, there was a desire to increase government accountability over those performing 
public services. 
The rationale behind expanding the workforce to ensure that there are enough 
government employees to perform all inherently governmental functions is sound.    
Although the private sector is able to perform many services more efficiently than the 
government, there are some functions that are inherently governmental, such as combat 
operations, public management, and policy and regulation formulation/execution.  For 
those inherently governmental positions, cost is not the determining factor because these 
functions can and should be performed by the federal government.  However, as of 
March 2010, of the positions the DoD identified for in-sourcing, only one third fell into 
the inherently governmental or “critical skills” categories (Chvotkin 2010).  It appears 
that the other positions were identified for in-sourcing based on cost assessments and 
other considerations, as outlined by the Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum (Lynn 
2009). 
The DoD’s insourcing initiatives and the accompanying rhetoric have drawn criticism 
from business leaders and contractors, who believe that private contractors are essential 
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to reducing costs for the DoD (Greenberg 2010).  In addition, several authoritative 
studies have concluded that the full cost of government employees or military personnel 
is at least equivalent to, if not significantly more than, the cost of contracted support.  The 
Congressional Budget Office, when analyzing logistics support for deployed military 
forces, concluded that “over a 20 year period, using army military units would cost 
roughly 90 percent more than using contractors” (CBO 2005).  Additionally, the 
Congressional Research Service wrote that “using contractors can save DoD money,” and 
“hiring contractors only as needed can be cheaper in the long run than maintaining a 
permanent in-house capability” (Schwartz 2009).  It appears that Secretary Gates has 
concurred with these assessments in at least one instance, as he has halted in-sourcing 
within the OSD (Greenberg 2010).  As of the time of publication, it remains to be seen 
whether in-sourcing is increasing or decreasing in aggregate.  Nonetheless, it is clear that 
contracting will continue to play an important role in the DoD even after the U.S. military 
presence is reduced in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Communication between Government and Contractor 
The FAR (2010) allows, and even encourages, acquisition personnel to “obtain 
information from potential contractors and others outside the Government for use in 
preparing Government estimates” prior to an RFP (FAR 37.101).  There is, at the same 
time, the restriction on contracting officers that they not make public “plans that would 
provide undue or discriminatory advantage to private or personal interests,” or 
information that was “received in confidence from an offeror” (FAR 37.101).  The rigid 
interpretation of this restriction has caused many government officials to limit 
communication between the government and private firms, even though such 
communication is encouraged by the FAR.  As the government’s chief information 
officer, Vivek Kundra observed, “there’s a chilling effect across the government where 
they think they’re going to go to jail if you talk to vendors before putting out the [request 
for proposal]” (Sternstein 2010).  Restricting communications between contractors and 
the government make it difficult for the acquisition personnel to accurately gauge 
industry capabilities, estimate program cost, identify more effective ways to write the 
statement of work, and develop effective program metrics.   
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The Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) Administrator, Dan Gordon, is behind 
an effort to start a new website in the summer of 2010 to facilitate collaboration between 
contractors and contract officers prior to the RFP’s release (Sternstein 2010).  This first 
step represents significant progress, but it remains to be seen if it will be enough to 
overcome the government contract officers’ culture of fear that limits communication 
with contractors.   
Laws, Regulations, and Processes 
The federal government’s laws and regulations are intended to ensure that the 
government gets the most benefit out of every taxpayer’s dollar.  In many instances, 
however, such regulations have the unintended impact of sacrificing economic efficiency 
to achieve other goals.  For example, full cost accounting provisions reduce competition 
by erecting high barriers of entry for new (e.g., commercial) firms to enter the defense 
market, as well as reduce potential savings opportunities from operating at higher 
economies of scale (through mixed commercial and defense operations).  Full 
competition is undermined as laws promote “fair” competition over effective 
competition.  Finally, Congress has passed provisions that mandate certain levels of work 
be done “in-house” to retain organic capability, regardless of whether such levels are 
efficient or not.  Many of these laws and regulations were written with the best of 
intentions, but they now reflect the deep political barriers to achieving effective 
competition and economic efficiency. 
Additionally, the government’s budgetary and acquisition processes were designed with 
multiple goals in mind.  More often than not, accomplishing these other goals negatively 
impacts the ability of the government to be efficient.  For instance, most government 
processes purposely separate authority and responsibility in order to minimize the 
opportunity for fraud.  This checks and balances system has resulted in a process “whose 
objective is not to get the work done at a reasonable cost, but to ensure that there are 
‘zero defects’” (Gansler 1989).  While the process has been effective at limiting fraud, 
the system has enabled high levels of inefficiency to exist.  
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The DoD’s Internal Acquisition Environment 
Although the DoD must be more efficient in the future to perform additional 
responsibilities within a constrained budget, the DoD is unlikely to deliver significantly 
improved outcomes of its acquisition of services by itself—barring substantial changes in 
government policies and budgets.  The DoD is handicapped by its inadequately sized 
acquisition workforce, which is also inadequately trained to contract for and manage 
performance-based service contracts, by its complex regulatory structure, developed for 
and focused on the acquisition of systems, and by the consolidation of the defense 
industry.   
Acquisition Workforce  
The acquisition workforce has several interrelated problems.  First, acquisition personnel 
have been disproportionately reduced in size since the end of the Cold War, leaving the 
DoD with insufficient manpower to fulfill its services acquisition role.  For instance, the 
acquisition workforce declined approximately 60% between FYs 1990 and 2006.  The 
vast majority of the reduction was accomplished through voluntary turnover, retirements, 
and hiring freezes.  Second, close to 70% of the DoD’s current acquisition workforce are 
“baby boomers” that will be eligible to retire in the next decade (Gansler, J. S., Lucyshyn, 
W., Arendt, M., 2008).  Not only could the DoD lose a significant portion of its 
workforce, but it would lose a significant amount of institutional knowledge in the near 
future.  Third, the acquisition workforce currently lacks many of the cutting-edge 
technical skills needed to acquire required services.  Many current employees have 
worked for the government for their entire career, and lack the technical and managerial 
skills that private sector firms have developed during the past two decades, particularly in 
fields such as information technology and system engineering. 
Finally, the DoD workforce lacks experience in PBSA contracting, management, and 
oversight.  Most of the acquisition training is focused on weapons systems acquisition, 
not on services.  This lack of training and experience hampers performance in this 
critical, and growing, segment of the DoD’s acquisitions.  Moreover, since virtually any 
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military organization that has O&M funding can contract for services, there are many 
non-acquisition personnel involved with the acquisition of services.  While this may seem 
to empower those personnel who would benefit most directly from the services provided 
by a contractor (and have an excellent idea of what kind of service they need), this 
distributed approach gives individuals, in many cases untrained in acquisition, 
responsibility for what often is a fairly sophisticated task.  Without the proper training to 
implement PBSA, these contracts will generally have suboptimal outcomes.    
Concern over the DoD’s Reliance on Contractor Support 
The U.S. Congress has recently examined the growing DoD reliance on contracting for 
services, and has expressed concerns about how to provide proper oversight for what it 
perceives to be higher risk, cost-plus contracts, many of which have been issued to 
companies supporting the U.S. military presence overseas in Iraq and Afghanistan 
(House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services 2009).  As the U.S. begins to 
play a smaller military role in Iraq and Afghanistan, and as the federal government 
responds to the looming fiscal crisis, it is reasonable to assume that the U.S. Congress 
will examine DoD expenditures on services with greater scrutiny in an effort to improve 
efficiency and return the budget to a more fiscally sustainable level.   
The DoD has begun to address these congressional concerns.  Ashton Carter, the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, released a 
memorandum in November 2010 that, among other new guidelines, urged acquisition 
teams to “give greater consideration to using Fixed-Price Incentive Fee (FPIF) contracts, 
particularly for efforts moving from development to production” (Carter 2010).  Carter 
advocates the use of cost reimbursement contracts for developmental efforts when the 
total cost of providing a service is difficult, if not impossible, to estimate prior to contract 
awarding.  To Carter, Fixed-Price Incentive Fee contracts are a way of transitioning from 
cost reimbursement towards Firm-Fixed-Price contracts.   However, because changes are 




Consolidation of the Defense Industry 
Following the DoD’s post-Cold War budget cuts, the DoD strongly encouraged the 
defense industry to consolidate in order to sustainably adapt to the long-term reduction in 
demand.  The government went as far as to reimburse some firms for the costs of merger 
and acquisition activities (Gansler, Lucyshyn, Arendt 2008).  Today, only six major 
defense firms operate domestically: Boeing, Lockheed Martin, BAE Systems North 
America, Raytheon, General Dynamics, and Northrop Grumman.  Based on the dynamics 
of the defense industry, these traditional defense firms have also changed their business 
models so that in addition to military hardware, they also provide services, such as IT and 
logistics services.  Coupled with the DoD’s cultural resistance for doing business with 
commercial firms, the small number of defense firms limits competition for new 
government contracts and further limits the opportunity for new and innovative firms to 
participate in the market. These factors provide an incentive for the government to spread 
awards so that all firms continue to survive.  Otherwise, the competing companies may be 
forced to merge again, further limiting competition for government contracts.   
Conclusion 
The DoD faces many challenges to efficiently acquire services.  Given that the DoD does 
not have the internal capacity to provide every form of service, the DoD has moved 
towards greater cooperation with the private sector to achieve its goals.  The DoD will 
likely become more reliant upon the private sector for services acquisition in the near-
term.  To achieve better results from its services acquisition—higher performance at 
similar or lower cost than services currently acquired—the DoD must move toward 
greater use of performance-based contracts. 
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III. Performance-Based Services Acquisition  
The DoD defines PBSA contracts as those that are “structured around the results to be 
achieved as opposed to the manner by which the work is to be performed” (Department 
of Defense 2009).  Alternatively, one can think of such contracts as “aligning the ‘post-
sale’ compensation stream with the ultimate requirement” (Vitasek, Cothran, Geary, & 
Rutner, 2006).  PBSA is termed performance-based because a company is compensated 
for the outcome it produces—a result—as opposed to the specific means and methods 
that the company uses—an input.  PBSA should use adequate incentives—both positive 
and negative—to incentivize contractors to produce superior results of the highest utility 
to the government. 
The effectiveness of contract incentives has been validated by extensive research, 
including an Institute for Defense Analyses report that concluded “contract incentives, if 
successful, are an inexpensive way to induce contractors to reduce costs” and improve 
performance (Tyson, et al. 1992).  PBSA also encourages greater competition for 
government contracts by potentially reducing the barriers firms face in entering the 
defense market.  By minimizing the use of DoD specified processes, standards, and 
procedures, PBSA reduces the barriers to entry for commercial firms, and thereby 
increases the potential number of competitive firms.  With greater incentives and 
flexibility to propose original solutions, along with increased competition, contractors 
will improve their performance, while lowering costs for the government.   
Performance-based Services Acquisition (PBSA) is only the latest and most popular 
incarnation of an “outcomes based approach to contracting.”  Outcomes based 
contracting was first implemented by the Office of Economic Opportunity in the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare from 1969–1971 (Edwards, V.J., & Nash, 
R.C., Jr. 2006).  In 1979, the U.S. Air Force used an outcomes-based contracting model 
for its base support services (Edwards, V.J., & Nash, R.C., Jr. 2006).  While both 
programs produced very mixed results and were discontinued, the Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy recognized the potential cost savings of outcomes-based contracting 
and made it available for the entire federal government in 1980 (Edwards, V.J., & Nash, 
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R.C., Jr. 2006).  PBSA became the latest term for outcomes-based contracting after the 
issuance of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy’s (OFPP) policy letter 91-2, entitled 
Service Contracting, issued on April 15, 1991.  This document established the basic 
definitions of PBSA that the government continues to use today.   
The OFPP policy letter 91-2 also issued a strong mandate to use PBSA, stating that,  
“[I]t is the policy of the Federal Government that (1) agencies use 
performance-based contracting methods to the maximum extent 
practicable when acquiring services, and (2) agencies carefully select 
acquisition and contract administration strategies, methods, and techniques 
that best accommodate the requirements” (Office of Federal Procurement 
Policy 1991).   
If an agency decides to use a strategy other than PBSA, the agency must justify its 
selection in writing.   
Although implemented in 1991, the FAR was not amended to incorporate PBSA policies 
contained in OFPP’s policy letter 91-2 until 1997 (GAO, 2008). 
Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 37 provides the DoD with the policy and procedures 
that are specific to the acquisition and management of services by contract.  This Part 
also identifies performance-based acquisition as the DoD’s “preferred method for 
acquiring services… [which should be used] to the maximum extent practicable,” except 
in certain circumstances (Department of Defense 2009).2  Finally, FAR (2010) Part 37 
states that the DoD should facilitate greater use of PBSA by reducing barriers to 
competition and by providing sufficient training to DoD service acquisition personnel 
(Department of Defense 2009).  
 
                                                 
2 These exceptions are specifically identified as architect-engineer services for public buildings, property 
and works; construction; utility services; and services that are incidental to supply purchases.  The 
regulation further stipulates that the DoD should use, in descending order of preference, (1) a firm-fixed 
price performance-based contract, (2) a non-fixed price performance-based contract, and then finally (3) a 
contract that is not performance-based.  The key purpose of the statute is to encourage and enable greater 
participation of the private sector in the DoD acquisition, while ensuring adherence to other legal 
regulations. 
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Elements of PBSA 
The Guidebook for Performance-Based Services Acquisition (PBSA) in the Department 
of Defense identifies four elements that are required, at a minimum, for an acquisition to 
be performance-based: (1) a performance work statement, describing the requirement as a 
measurable outcome; (2) measurable performance standards, used to define acceptable 
outcomes and determine if performance thresholds have been achieved; (3) remedies, the 
incentives and penalties used to provide incentives for performance; and (4) a 
performance assessment plan, detailing performance metrics as well as  how the 
contractor will be evaluated Gansler 2000).  
In 2006, the Department of Commerce, Department of Defense, Department of 
Agriculture, Department of Treasury, the General Services Administration, and a private 
firm, Acquisition Solutions, issued a joint guidebook entitled Seven Steps to 
Performance-Based Services Acquisition.  The steps outlined by the guidebook are 
presented below in Figure 1.  A more thorough explanation of each step can be found in 
Appendix A.      
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Figure 1: Seven Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition (Interagency-Industry Partnership 
in Performance, 2006) 
The objective of PBSA is to buy measurable outcomes (i.e., those measures of 
effectiveness used to define the outcomes).  At the top level, they should be based on the 
users requirements and include only a few simple, realistic, consistent, and easily 
quantifiable metrics (focused on operational performance and value-added process 
indicators).  These metrics can then be linked, through the contract vehicle, to supplier 
incentives. 
Performance-based contracts offer potentially large benefits for both simple tasks—such 
as cutting the grass—as well as more complex tasks—such as providing complete 
logistics support to a major weapon system.  These performance-based contracts differ 
significantly from the DoD’s more traditional contracts, otherwise known as compliance 
contracting or regulatory contracting.  With the traditional process, the DoD generally 
specifies the process to be used to achieve the desired result.  To ensure that the 
government receives the exact service as defined in the contract, the DoD employs 
oversight measures to ensure contract compliance.  Metrics and incentives may be used in 
5. Decide how to 
measure and manage 
performance 
1. Establish an 
integrated solutions team 
2. Describe the problem 
that needs solving 
3. Examine private-
sector and public-sector 
solutions 
7. Manage performance 
4. Develop a performance 
work statement (PWS) or 
statement of objectives 
(SOO) 
6. Select the right 
contractor 
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traditional contracting, but such metrics are input-oriented: incentives reward a contractor 
for adherence to the government specified process used, not the measurable performance 
of their output.  These types of contracts do not effectively incentivize contractors to 
continuously improve performance and reduce costs; administration of these contracts is 
relatively straightforward.  In many ways, this process reflects the DoD’s weapon system 
acquisition process, which generally makes extensive use of military standards and 
specifications. 
In contrast, Performance-based Services Acquisition focuses on the task the DoD requires 
without specifying the process a contractor should use to deliver the service.  The focus, 
using performance metrics, is on how effectively the tasks have been accomplished.  Due 
to the increased complexity of tasks, both pre- and post-contract award, administration is 
more challenging than under the traditional management style.  Figure 2 summarizes the 
differences between the two methods of contracting.  
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Aspect Traditional Performance-Based 
Requirements 
Determination 
Done through use of 
detailed specifications and 
processes 
Done through use of 
performance specifications 
and objectives 
Statement of Work Detailed specifications and 
processes provided to 
contractor, deviation not 
allowed without prior 
approval 
Focuses on outcome desired 
and leaves the how to 
contractor 
Quality Assurance Oversight, detailed 
inspections, and audits 
Insight, surveillance plans, 
use of commercial 
standards 
Selection Procedures Emphasis on lowest cost, 
minimum acceptable 
technical capability 
Use of competitive 
negotiations, best value 
approach 
Contract Type Fixed-price or cost-
reimbursement with very 
few awards or incentives 
Fixed-price or cost-




Contract Administration Simple when compared to 
performance-based 
contracting 
Complex due to 
administration of 
award/incentive clauses 
Program Management Complex government 
management toward the 
desired performance results 
Government management is 
largely oversight, contractor 
is motivated toward desired 
performance results 
 
Figure 2: Differences between traditional and performance-based acquisition (Fuhs 1998) 
Anticipated Benefits and Potential Risks of PBSA 
Use of PBSA strategies offers numerous benefits to the government, but its 
implementation requires surmounting several potential risks.   
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Benefits of PBSA 
Improved performance – PBSA helps align the objectives of the contractor with those of 
the government.  Contractors, tasked with achieving outcomes as opposed to fulfilling 
tasks, (1) have the freedom to implement the strategy that would provide best value to the 
customer, (2) can update their methods without the need to change contractual 
obligations, and (3) have the incentive to achieve their best performance.  These 
conditions foster the best effort and innovation on the part of the contractor, maximize 
the potential for the government to receive optimal contractor performance, and result in 
a “win-win” for both the government and the contractor. 
Lower cost – Top commercial firms have used performance-based contracts to reduce 
costs of services even as they raise performance.  The federal government, unlike the 
private sector in its budgetary processes, is not focused on profits; rather, it is focused on 
transparency; minimizing fraud, waste, and abuse; holding public servants accountable; 
and costs.  The federal government thus often retains more cost-inefficient practices and 
processes, and will significantly benefit from PBSA’s cost savings. 
Increased innovation – PBSA encourages innovation by granting firms flexibility to 
determine the processes they use to perform the required function.  Since they are 
incentivized throughout the contract to meet the required metrics while minimizing the 
cost, competitive firms will continuously innovate to improve their processes while 
reducing costs.   
Greater use of commercial services – As noted in a memo issued by the Office of the 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Reform, “the vast majority of service 
requirements are commercial in nature” (Gansler 2000).  Although government policy 
explicitly embraces greater use of commercial off-the-shelf technologies and commercial 
standards, the DoD has been slow to fully implement these policies.  By focusing on 
performance over process, PBSA helps to reduce barriers to entry for commercial firms.   
More effective oversight – Traditionally, the DoD has spent a large amount of resources 
verifying that contractors comply with the detailed processes and procedures the 
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government specifies in its contracts—regardless of whether such compliance produces 
better outcomes.  For over a decade and a half, the DoD has been committed to reforms 
that “ensure that oversight and review of contract management add value to the process 
and are minimally intrusive” (Department of Defense 1995).  With the performance-
based contract structure, the government can reduce the cost and increase the 
effectiveness of its oversight by tracking appropriately selected performance metrics to 
monitor contractor performance.  
Greater contractor-government cooperation – DoD services are provided through an 
ever-widening network of contractors.  Through several attributes listed above, PBSA 
encourages a greater contractor-government partnership that is more collaborative and 
less adversarial than traditional contracting, which implies that companies cannot be 
trusted to provide a service without being told how to do it.  PBSA, on the other hand, is 
predicated on trust and accountability.  Private companies are given more flexibility to 
find cost-effective solutions, and also agree to meet the required performance metrics, 
which are often used to determine incentives.   
Greater agility – Contracting for services affords a greater surge staffing capability, 
giving the DoD a cost-efficient way to augment capabilities during times of increased 
demand.  On the other hand, during times of decreased demand, the DoD can quickly 
save operating costs by reducing its reliance on services contractors, something not 
possible with full-time government employees.  Moreover, when contracting for services, 
there is no long-tail cost: the DoD does not have any financial obligation to contractors 
once the service is delivered or no longer required.  Services contracting can also provide 
the DoD with quick access to required expertise; by contrast, the time required for the 
DoD to advertise a job position, review applications, perform job interviews, and make 
job offers is often considerably longer.   
Potential Risks of PBSA 
Perception that the government has less control – Critics of PBSA argue that the 
government, by not issuing explicit specifications, will have less control, and as a result, 
could receive less satisfactory performance.  This has been shown not to be the case, as 
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the government must identify its critical desired outcomes and then identify the 
appropriate performance metrics necessary to incentivize the contractor.  In many ways 
this is a superior way of managing outcomes than the traditional method, which has 
proven to be highly inefficient.   
Questionable applicability – Several critics of PBSA argue that this strategy can only be 
used for certain types of services.  Most of these critics argue that PBSA is best used for 
contracts that include “many common, routine, and relatively simple services” (Edwards 
& Nash, 2007, pg. 35).  PBSA would not be effective for a second category where 
objectives “are too long-term and complex to permit complete specification of results and 
competitive pricing at the outset of contracting” (Edwards & Nash, 2007, pg. 35).  The 
second category may include R&D in support of the DoD’s Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs (MDAPs), which account for a significant portion of the DoD’s services 
acquisition budget.  For such contracts, performance-based contracts may not be as 
effective because PBSA relies on relatively stable requirements and a low-risk 
environment.   
Ineffective metrics – Appropriately chosen metrics (1) direct contractor efforts and (2) 
provide effective oversight.  Although concern for appropriate metrics is valid for all 
DoD contracts, ineffective metrics particularly undermine PBSA contracts because they 
form the basis of evaluating contractor performance.  Metrics and corresponding 
incentives help align the interests of the contractor with the government.  If the two are 
not aligned because metrics misdirect contractors towards unimportant services, then 
such contracts will be implemented with suboptimal results.  Additionally, the 
government’s oversight must rely on accurate, independently verified data.  In many 
cases, however, the contractors usually furnish the government with this data, presenting 
a potential conflict of interest.  For the incentives to be effective, the government must 
have reliable data that it can use to provide oversight of a contractor’s performance.  
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Recent Efforts to Encourage the Use of PBSA 
PBSA policy was reinforced in 2000, when then-Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Jacques Gansler issued a memorandum to the 
Secretaries of the Military Departments, Directors of the Defense Agencies, and the 
Director of Defense Logistics Agency that stated “performance-based strategies for the 
acquisition of services are to be used wherever possible” (Gansler 2000).  The 
memorandum reinforced this goal by requiring that, at a minimum, “50 percent of service 
acquisitions, measured both in dollars and actions, are to be performance-based by the 
year 2005” (Gansler 2000).  The memorandum also stated that a guidebook would be 
issued by the end of the year to facilitate greater use of PBSA.  
The Office of Federal Procurement Policy’s Guide to Best Practices for Performance-
Based Service Contracts (1998) and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition Reform’s Guidebook for Performance-Based Services Acquisition (PBSA) in 
the Department of Defense (2000) were issued to clarify the PBSA policy documents 
identified above.  In 2006, a more recent guidebook was issued, the Seven Steps to 
Performance-Based Services Acquisition.  These guides reaffirm the DoD’s commitment 
to using PBSA, offer recommendations on how to implement PBSA, and include 
examples of successful uses of the strategy.  The guidebooks stress that the overall 
objectives of PBSA are to maximize performance, increase competition and innovation, 
encourage the use of commercial services, shift risk from the government to industry, and 
achieve savings.   
How often is PBSA used? 
The most recent information regarding the DoD’s use of PBSA is presented in Figure 3, 
detailing FYs 2001–2010.  According to the data, PBSA expenditures grew significantly 
in dollar terms between FY 2001 and FY 2010.  When viewed as a percentage of the 
DoD’s service expenditures (including R&D), PBSA also grew substantially, rising from 
approximately 21% in FY 2001–2003 to over 60% in FY 2010 (see Figure 3).   
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FY Eligible PBA Dollars PBA Dollars % PBA Dollars
2001 $24,369,083,314 $5,431,665,703 22.29%
2002 $82,905,157,256 $18,432,693,367 22.23%
2003 $104,977,082,577 $25,270,487,420 24.07%
2004 $40,675,922,546 $14,127,402,826 34.73%
2005 $91,965,709,590 $49,962,824,873 54.33%
2006 $187,284,648,352 $140,580,470,455 75.06%
2007 $104,739,827,508 $38,630,826,792 36.88%
2008 $115,080,414,797 $45,386,403,984 39.44%
2009 $34,039,358,903 $16,925,720,405 49.72%
2010 $107,371,230,384 $67,011,955,731 62.41%  
Figure 3: PBSA use in the DoD (Federal Procurement Data System–Next Generation, 2010) 
There was a spike in FY 2005 and FY 2006 as seen in Figure 4, undoubtedly related to 
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Figure 4:  Percent DoD of PBSA eligible Dollars on PBSA contracts (Federal Procurement Data 
System–Next Generation, 2010) 
It is also difficult to discern how much of the increase in PBSA expenditures was due to 
an increase in awarding of PBSA contracts and how much was due to the change in the 
definition of a contract that could be classified as PBSA.  For FY 2004 and prior, the 
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Federal Procurement Data System–Next Generation required that “a minimum of 80 
percent of the requirements under the procurement action must meet the FAR standards” 
in order for a program to be classified as PBSA (Federal Procurement Data System-Next 
Generation 2010).  The reporting requirement was lowered, however, for FY 2005 and 
beyond to the minimum threshold of 50%.  One would expect the relaxation of the 
definition of PBSA to increase the number of contracts that would report using PBSA, 
and hence PBSA expenditures—but by how much is unclear.   
How fully do contracts implement PBSA strategies? 
As with information regarding the number of programs that use PBSA methods, the 
extent to which programs use PBSA strategies is uncertain.  The most relevant 
information comes from a 2002 GAO report that undertook interviews with acquisition 
personnel.  The report determined that the largest proportion of its sample of contracts 
only partially implemented PBSA: of the 25 contracts assessed, nine implemented all 
elements of PBSA, four clearly did not exhibit any element of PBSA, and the final 12 
contracts partially implemented PBSA (GAO, 2002a).  The final 12 contracts justified 
only partially implementing PBSA by stating that the services provided “were either 
unique to government, very complex and technical, and/or high risk… [such that program 
officers] could not forego maintaining a strong role in specifying how the work should be 
done as well as overseeing the work” (GAO 2002a).   
Do PBSA contracts yield better results? 
One early study undertaken by the Office of Federal Procurement Policy found that, in a 
sample of 26 contracts, “agencies reported an average 15 percent reduction in contract 
price in nominal dollars, and an 18 percent improvement in satisfaction with the 
contractors’ work” (Office of Federal Procurement Policy 1998).   Several findings agree 
that the DoD must implement a more comprehensive and consistent information tracking 
system to analyze programs in the post-award phase (Acquisition Advisory Panel 2007; 
Geren and Gansler 2007; Government Accountability Office 2008).  At present, the DoD 
is unable to reliably track cost and performance as they evolve over time, making 
temporal comparisons of contracts difficult.  As a result, comparisons between contracts 
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are often invalid.  Aside from high-level aggregated data, little information exists in the 
public domain regarding the efficacy of PBSA.  As the government gains experience in 
PBSA contracting, and as tracking systems become more reliable, then future studies can 
more accurately evaluate the performance of PBSA contracts.    
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IV. Case Studies 
Selected case studies highlight both the potential benefits and challenges with 
implementing PBSA.  Performance-Based Logistics (PBL) represents a largely positive 
PBSA experience, whereas the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) underscores the 
challenges facing services acquisition personnel pre-contract and post-contract awarding.   
Performance-Based Logistics (PBL) 
Many have argued vigorously that (1) “no area needs transformation more than the DoD 
logistics” and (2) the DoD itself “cannot transform… without transforming logistics” 
(Gansler and Lucyshyn 2006).  The logistics system—which the DoD spends hundreds of 
billions of dollars on every year—provides a relatively high cost, low quality logistics 
system when compared to world-class commercial firms.  For example, although the 
DoD has improved its acquisition markedly since the 1991 Gulf War, the DoD still lags 
markedly behind world class delivery standards (see Figure 5).  Additional problems of 
ad-hoc logistics structure include limited cost visibility and performance accountability 
within the system.   
Traditional Logistics Method 
The goal of the DoD's traditional logistics method was to ensure maximum weapon 
system availability.  In order to operate this “just-in-case” system, the DoD established an 
extensive logistics network that “had to estimate and compute the requirements; then 
procure, store, and when required, ship the necessary parts” to ensure that items were 
always in inventory when needed (Gansler and Lucyshyn 2006).  Over time, the system 
has amassed large inventory stockpiles—especially due to the unintended tendency of 
this approach to increase demand through two phenomena known as the whiplash effect 
and supply push.  Currently, the system has high and rising maintenance costs, long 
customer wait times, and limited flexibility to adapt to changing operational 
requirements.  These problems are compounded by the lack of integration for the system, 
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Figure 5: Logistics Results: “Successful,” but not World-Class 
 
Performance-Based Logistics (PBL)  
Performance-Based Logistics, the DoD’s preferred management strategy for logistics, 
provides a significant experience base in PBSA.  PBL shifts the focus of logistics from 
purchasing products to purchasing outcomes.  For instance, contractors will be paid “not 
for the work done on the airplane, but for the work done by the airplane. If the airplane 
flies, the contractor earns a profit; and, if it meets specified availability targets, the 
contractor earns increased profit from incentive bonuses; but if the plane doesn’t fly, the 
contractor earns little or no profit” (emphasis in original, Vitasek et al., 2006).  As with 
other PBSA contracts, bidding firms now have the opportunity to propose solutions to a 
problem that allow innovation and greater competition.  The DoD officially adopted PBL 
in 2001, in a deliberate attempt to overcome the problems and inefficiencies of the 
existing logistics system.   
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PBL reduces ownership costs by reducing contractor “incentives to maximize the price 
on every item sold to the government”—as companies typically tend to “low-ball” bids 
for development projects and then make their profits from lengthy logistics contracts 
(Goure 2009).  By connecting performance with contractor pay, firms have an incentive 
to continuously improve their service.  As a result, everyone wins—the contractor can 
achieve higher rewards while having greater flexibility to improve its services, the 
government gains continuous performance improvements at low cost, and the warfighter 
attains better equipment that is available earlier and more often.  
PBL can apply to four levels of operation: (1) component, (2) subsystem, (3) platform 
and (4) integrated system/mission.  Currently, PBL is utilized most often at the sub 
system levels.   
History 
The military first used a performance-based contract for logistics in 1996.  In reaction to 
the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) decision to close a California base for the Air 
Force F-117 Nighthawk. Lockheed Martin (maker of the F-117),  
“presented a proposal to the Air Force to assume responsibility for the 
majority of F-117 non-core support functions in a contracting approach 
that was based on achieving specified support metrics targets, a significant 
change from traditional ‘providing transactional goods and services’ 
contract support – and at an attractive cost” (Vitasek et al., 2006).   
The DoD accepted this proposal and the contract was able to achieve its high goals.  The 
DoD built upon this initial success—after successful implementation of PBL in other 
pilot projects—with similar contracts.   
In 1997, the Federal Acquisition Regulation was amended to incorporate PBSA policies 
as required by OFPP’s policy letter 91-2 issued in 1991.  The DoD reiterated its emphasis 
on PBSA in its 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, which explicitly supported 
PBL.  A few months later, in November 2001, the DoD “identified PBL as the preferred 
weapons system support strategy” (GAO 2008).  Since that point in time, the DoD has 
issued several policy memoranda supporting expanded use of PBL. 
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Criticism of PBL 
The primary criticism leveled against PBL does not address cost or performance, but 
instead the reliability of contractors.  Critics argue that the military places itself in a 
dangerous position of relying too heavily on potentially fickle contractors.  Many military 
planners fear that the “lack of control due to outsourcing could weigh even heavier and 
even put an entire military operation at risk” if, for example, the contractors were to pull 
out of a war zone (Singer 2008).  These fears have proven to be unfounded by successful 
use of PBL in current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, where such suspicions have not 
materialized. 
Another concern is that there is no easy way to implement PBL.  PBL is difficult to 
implement, because it is a time intensive activity. Jerry Cothran, then-program director for 
PBL at the Defense Acquisition University, noted in a magazine article that “setting up even 
component-level PBLs can take 24 to 30 months, while implementing PBL for an entire 
new aircraft may require four to six years” (Canaday 2006).  According to a presentation 
given by the Navy’s Supply Chain Solutions Division, the problem is more complicated;  
each system, in effect, requires a unique PBL solution that is unlikely to be 
interchangeable with prior solutions (Klevan 2008).  Although implementing PBL may 
entail challenges, the DoD could achieve significant benefits from successfully 
implementing PBL more often.  Moreover, these concerns are likely to be overstated.  
Past experience has shown that the DoD can gain immediate benefits from implementing 
an incomplete PBL in the short term, albeit the majority of benefits will accrue later once 
PBL is fully implemented.  Moreover, while each program may require a unique PBL, 
subsequent implementation of PBL should benefit from past experience and transfer of 
lessons learned to new programs.  
Successful PBL examples 
Despite criticism and challenges, many PBL programs have been successful.  This report 
first presents a brief summary of several successful PBL cases, and then provides a mini-
case study on the SH-60 Seahawk Tip-to-Tail PBL contract. 
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Examples of PBL Results 
Figures 6 and 7 highlight examples of cases where PBL has reduced costs and improved 
performance.  Cost benefits from PBL reflect realized savings from Operations and 
Support costs after PBL’s implementation (time frame for PBL savings varies between 
programs).  Benefits were calculated by Randy Fowler, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Materiel Readiness DASD(MR). A majority of the examples are aircraft 
systems from a number of categories, including fighter aircraft, cargo aircraft, and utility 
helicopters.  The Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as the United Kingdom Ministry of 
Defense, have utilized PBL for their systems.   
Program System Description PBL Owner Total Cost 
Benefit ($M) 
C-17 Transport aircraft Air Force $477 
F/A-18 Fighter/attack aircraft Navy $688 
AH-64 Attack helicopter Army $100 
TOW-ITAS Integrated mobile missile 
and targeting system 
Army $350 
Sentinel AN/MPQ-64 Mobile air defense radar Army $302 
CH-47 (UK) Cargo helicopter UK Ministry of 
Defense 
$250 
Figure 6: Examples of PBL Cost Benefits (Fowler 2009)
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F/A-18 Fighter/attack aircraft Navy 23% -74% 
Tires Aircraft tires Navy 17% -92% 
F-22 Fighter Air Force 15% -20% 
UH-60 
Avionics 
Utility helicopter Army 14% -85% 
F404 Engine Jet engine for the F/A-
18 aircraft 
Navy 46% -25% 
Figure 7: Examples of PBL Performance Benefits (Fowler 2009) 
SH-60 Seahawk Tip-to-Tail (T2T) PBL Contract 
The SH-60 Seahawk is a Navy family of twin-engine, medium lift helicopters.  The 
aircraft can be outfitted for a number of missions, including “anti-submarine warfare, 
search and rescue, drug interdiction, anti-ship warfare, cargo lift, and special operations” 
(United States Navy 2009).  The SH-60 is a derivate of the Army’s Black Hawk (UH-60) 
helicopter, which was first fielded in 1979.  The first SH-60 entered service in 1983.  
Since that point in time, several variations of the helicopter now serve the Navy (United 
States Navy 2009). 
                                                 
3 Availability Improvement is defined as a system that is ready for tasking, operational readiness, mission 
capable, etc. 
4 Cycle Time Reduction may also be described as logistics response time or repair turnaround time. 
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Between 2002 and 2003, the 
Navy awarded four firm-fixed-
price PBL contracts to support the 
SH-60 Seahawk.  The total value 
of these contracts was $658.8 
million.  The SH-60 Tip-to-Tail 
(T2T) PBL contract was the 
largest of these PBL contracts, 
valued at $417 million.  The Navy 
awarded Maritime Helicopter Support Company (MHSCo), a joint venture company 
formed between Lockheed Martin Systems Integration and Sikorsky Aircraft Company, a 
five-year contract in December 2003 (Department of Defense Office of the Inspector 
General 2006).   
The T2T contract represented one of the DoD’s first attempts to provide logistics services 
for two major subsystems of the platform, the airframe and avionics.  The contractor is 
responsible for the “repair, overhaul, modification, procurement (for components worn 
out by attrition), packaging, handling, storage, outbound transportation, configuration 
management, obsolescence management, and reliability management/sustainment of 
1,262 Navy managed airframe and avionics repairable items," servicing over 400 
helicopters in use by the Navy, Coast Guard, and five foreign military forces that have 
purchased the SH-60 aircraft through Foreign Military Sales (Naval Inventory Control 
Point Commander 2008).  Although the contractor was not responsible for the 
maintenance of the entire system, it was tasked with servicing a large number of items 
that the system needs to operate.  
The primary purpose of the PBL contract was to significantly improve the availability 
and overall readiness of the SH-60.  The Navy believed that an acceptable contract would 





The contract included incentives linked to contractor performance.  The contract relied 
upon two main metrics.  The primary metric used was requisition fill rate, defined as the 
percentage of requisitions filled within a predetermined time frame for approximately 
1,250 items.  Time frames depended on the priority of an item and its asset weight.  The 
base agreement was for a 73% fill rate, compared to the pre-PBL rate of 63%.  Contract 
incentives were linked to specified fill rates.  If the contractor achieved a 75% fill rate, 
then they would receive 40% of the total incentive fee; if they achieved a 77% fill rate, 
then they would receive 75% of the total incentive fee; and if they achieved a fill rate 
higher than 80%, then they would receive 100% of the total incentive fee.   
The second metric, reliability, required the contractor to ensure that the current fail rate 
for 80 critical items did not vary more than one standard deviation from the baseline fail 
rate.  This baseline was determined by comparing the average number of failures per 
100,000 flight hours over the eleven quarters preceding contract implementation for each 
of the 80 items that had previously been identified as important cost and readiness 
drivers.  If the contractor did not meet its fill rate obligation, but met the fail rate 
requirement, any portion of the incentive fee that the contractor did not earn during that 
period would be made available during the next incentive fee period. 
Results 
According to the contractor's data, the fill rate for the nine quarters preceding PBL ranged 
between 63–67%.  Following the implementation of PBL, performance has ranged from 
82–95% (Fleming 2009).  As a result, the contractors have received 100% of the 
available contractor incentive.  Despite this approximate 20 percentage point increase in 
fill rate, the T2T decreased the Navy's total ownership cost for SH-60 support.  The Navy 
projected that, overall, the T2T PBL has produced $41 million in cost savings or 
avoidance over the contract life (Naval Inventory Control Point Commander 2008). 
Overall, the SH-60 T2T PBL contract showcases several benefits and challenges to 
implementing PBL and PBSA more broadly.  This PBL shows how PBL can be a win-
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win situation for the government and the contractor.  The Navy received 20% greater 
performance without losing its organic capability, and at the same time, decreased its 
total ownership costs.  The contractor, meanwhile, had the flexibility to overcome 
numerous challenges and was able to earn the maximum incentive fee.   
In August 2006, the DoD Inspector General issued a report criticizing the Navy's 
oversight of SH-60 PBL contracts.  The report notes that, although the Navy constructed 
an effective plan to oversee the PBL contracts, the Navy only implemented its plan 
partially (Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General 2006).  The principle 
concern raised was that the Navy did not fulfill its obligation to independently monitor 
contract outcomes.  By relying solely on contractor information to determine progress, 
the Navy potentially compromised effective oversight.  The report did conclude, 
however, that the contractor's data appeared credible and overall performance had 
improved.   
The SH-60 T2T PBL contract highlights the importance of an effective government 
information system.  In this case, the government was unable to independently verify 
contractor performance several years into the contract (Department of Defense Office of 
the Inspector General 2006).  Although the government does not have reason to suspect 
MHSCo tampered with its figures, the government should not place a company in such a 
blatant conflict-of-interest situation.   
Lessons Learned 
There are several lessons to be learned from SH-60 T2T PBL.   
 PBL, and more broadly PBSA, can produce significant benefits.   
The SH-60 T2T PBL achieved approximately a 20% increase in performance 
while lowering the DoD’s total ownership costs for the program.   
 Initial PBL contracts are likely to achieve significant performance 
improvement. 
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Follow-on PBL contracts are likely to ensure that performance will continue to 
improve over time, providing long-term benefit to the DoD from continued use.  
 The government should implement a consistent set of metrics to allow 
comparisons between similar types of programs.   
Without a way to compare the performance of programs, the DoD will be limited 
in its ability to evaluate contractor performance and determine if it is attaining the 
best value for its money.  
 The relationship between the customer and contractor is key to achieving the 
program’s successful outcome.   
The Lockheed Program Manager for the T2T contract stressed the importance of 
this relationship in a 2009 e-mail (Fleming 2009).  Without a good working 
relationship, the contractor and the government would have been unable to 
coordinate to address the problems—both known and unexpected—that could 
have undermined the purpose of the partnership.  
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The Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) 
The Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) is a dual-service program to provide the 
Department of the Navy (DoN) with the majority of its required information technology 
services.  NMCI currently networks over 350,000 computers, called “seats,”  serving 
more than 700,000 users at more than 620 locations globally, making it the largest 
intranet in the world (HP Enterprise Services 2009).  This network has largely replaced 
the plethora of non-interoperable legacy systems that predated NMCI.  Despite recent 
improvements in performance, NMCI has achieved largely mixed development results 
(Perera 2009).  NMCI suffered from a number of setbacks, including delayed 
implementation, reduced performance, and higher cost when compared to initial 
estimates. 
Although not explicitly labeled a PBSA program, NMCI, as it was first proposed by the 
DoN in its RFP, included a number of PBSA components: an emphasis on outputs, 
metrics, and incentives.  First, the contract was for a service (the provision of "seat" 
capability) as opposed to a series of products (desktops, network, networking software, 
etc.) that the DoN would manage itself.  Second, as originally formulated, the program 
was to be performance-based.  The NMCI RFP included provisions for both results 
oriented metrics and variable contract reward based on contractor performance.  
NMCI and Network Centric Warfare 
The DoN originally formulated the idea for an integrated information network following 
the DoD’s official adoption of a new warfighting paradigm known as Network Centric 
Warfare (NCW).  The impetus for creating NCW was the assertion that information 
superiority will be the key factor to fighting effectively in the future.  The fighting force 
that is better able to collect, interpret, and transmit data to its warfighters will have a 
decisive edge in battle.  Specifically, the DoN believes that NCW,  
“[W]ill dramatically improve naval combat capability and efficiency by 
helping the fleet to achieve what DoN officials have called "speed of 
command" (an ability to generate and execute commands at much higher 
speeds), which will permit U.S. naval forces to outpace adversary 
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decision-making and thereby lock out (i.e., foreclose) potential adversary 
strategies” (O'Rourke 2002).   
One of the DoN’s first attempts at implementing NCW was the Naval Virtual Intranet 
(NVI), first mentioned in a white paper in late 1997.  As described in its white paper, the 
purpose of the NVI was to “enhance Naval war fighting capabilities and reduce operating 
costs to all ashore and afloat commands, both within the continental Unites States and 
throughout the world” (Taylor 2006).  The NVI was to achieve its objectives by replacing 
the inefficient operation of individual command-owned IT systems with an integrated 
Navy-wide system (Taylor 2006).   
The DoN would change the name of the NVI several times before renaming the modified 
and expanded program as the NMCI.  This name was chosen in part to emphasize the 
inclusion of both the Navy and the Marines Corps in the DoN’s intranet.   
The DoN’s two strategic goals for the NMCI were to provide information superiority and 
to foster innovation.  The Navy defines information superiority as "providing the 
capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while 
exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same" (Government Accountability 
Office 2006).  In order to foster innovation, the DoN must create an "environment that 
supports innovative ways of integrating doctrine and tactics, training, and supporting 
activities into new operational capabilities and more productive ways of using resources” 
(Government Accountability Office 2006). Other goals of the program included reducing 
overall ownership costs and improving IT services performance.  In order to achieve this 
goal, the contractor was responsible for a number of tasks including (1) continuous 
hardware refreshment; (2) standardization of software applications across the system, 
including reducing the number of legacy applications; and (3) development and 
implementation of an integrated, streamlined, and secure enterprise-wide information 




RFP Features  
The final RFP, released in December 1999,  stated that the NMCI should reach “initial 
operation capability (IOC) by the end of 2001 and full operational capability (FOC) by 
the end of 2002, with the more intensive functions of the intranet not available until later 
in the year” (Taylor 2006).   
Congress quickly began criticizing the RFP for two reasons.  First, although the projected 
budget was in the billions, the program did not have an official budget as the Navy 
determined that it could fund the NMCI from its general IT funds.  Congress disagreed, 
believing that the program should have a unique budget line.  Second, Congress 
determined that the Navy had not sufficiently studied the feasibility of the NMCI or its 
potential impact on federal employees.  These concerns were highlighted by a GAO 
report in March 2000 that called the program “unnecessarily risky” and advised a slower 
implementation schedule (Government Accountability Office 2000).  Consequently, 
Congress mandated that NMCI conduct a business case analysis.  These delays caused 
the award to be pushed back from the initial date in May 2000 to October of that year.   
Early in the NMCI formulation, DoN made two important decisions.  First, the services 
of the NMCI would be largely outsourced.  Second, the contract would be performance-
based.   
The DoN primarily sought to contract with the private sector because it did not believe 
that the DoN had the capability to develop and implement such a holistic information 
system.  Given that the DoN did not believe that it could generate such a capability, and 
that it wished to implement the NMCI as quickly as possible, contracting much of the 
technical work to the private market was the Navy's only realistic option.  Additional 
reasons for contracting included (1) gaining access to cutting-edge private sector 
technologies and managerial experience quickly while maintaining the flexibility to 
downsize such an effort easily; (2) fulfilling the federal government's commitment to 
contracting with the private market; and (3) the belief that outsourcing would allow the 
DoD to focus on its core mission of warfighting, leaving implementation and continuous 
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IT improvement to firms that specialize in such functions (Government Accountability 
Office 2002). 
The Navy produced an extensive performance plan for the program.  The DoN started by 
identifying its two strategic goals, information superiority and fostering innovation.  The 
Navy then identified nine strategic performance measurement categories and related them 
to the strategic goals of the NMCI program.  These nine categories were interoperability; 
security and information assurance; workforce capabilities; process improvement; 
operational performance; service efficiency; customer satisfaction; program management; 
and network operations and maintenance (Government Accountability Office 2006).  The 
plan included "metrics, targets, and comparative baselines that were to be used for the 
first annual performance report... [along with the Navy's commitment to] fully develop 
performance measures for each of the categories and... produce an annual report on 
NMCI’s performance in each of the categories” (Government Accountability Office 
2006).   
Contract 
In October of 2000, the DoN awarded the NMCI contract to Electronics Data Systems 
(EDS)5.  The contract was a “firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity 
contract with performance incentives” (Government Accountability Office 2002).  The 
sole-source contract had a 5-year base agreement with a minimum value of $4.1 billion, 
along with a 3-year option for an additional $2.8 billion.  The contract required delivery 
of approximately 415,000 seats.  The contract was subsequently restructured in 2003 into 
a 7-year, “$6 billion contract with a 3-year option for an additional $2.8 billion” 
(Government Accountability Office 2006).  In 2006, the Navy exercised its option.  The 
contract, set to expire in September 2010, will have been for 10 years and a minimum of 
$9.3 billion.   
                                                 
5 Electronics Data Systems is now known as HP Enterprise Services, following HP’s acquisition of the 
company in 2008. 
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Incentive Structure Change 
Although the DoN did use a performance incentive contract structure, it did not fully 
implement its performance-based plan developed prior to contracting.  The NMCI tied 
incentives to contract specified performance service level agreements (SLAs) and 
customer satisfaction surveys, but its metrics were not successful in completely aligning 
the interests of the contractor with that of the government.     
The NMCI contract specified two levels of performance incentives, which were 
dependent upon the percentage of operational seats at a given location.  The two levels 
are "full payment" and "full performance." 
Full payment refers to sites where 50–90% of the planned seats are "cutover."  Cutover 
refers to "the point at which the NMCI operating environment is to function in full 
support of contracted service level agreements" (Government Accountability Office 
2002).  To achieve full payment, the contractor must meet 100% of relevant service level 
agreements.  The contractor receives full payment if performance is at or above target for 
either (1) the current month or (2) two out of the three preceding months.  If a contractor 
does not meet such performance specifications, the firm receives only 85% of the 
maximum payment per seat (Government Accountability Office 2006).  
Full performance refers to those sites where over 90% of planned seats are cutover.  To 
receive full payment, the contractor must meet the same specifications as required for the 
full payment case.  If a contractor fails to achieve this level of performance, however, the 
"contractor is required to provide “financial credits” to the Navy” (Government 
Accountability Office 2006).  In this way, the threshold for performance automatically 
increases as the contractor meets its operational objectives.   
SLAs track information such as (1) average time a help desk representative takes to 
answer an inquiry, (2) the performance of e-mail transfers, and (3) the percent of 
bandwidth used to provide connection to external networks (Government Accountability 
Office 2006).  The metrics created incentives that improved performance and security, 
but by definition also hampered operations. For example, large files (over 5MB) were not 
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allowed (because they slowed network performance); this complicated the operations of 
several Communities of Interest.  Zip files were not allowed, because they were seen as a 
security risk, as they could potentially contain malware (Jordan 2007).   
Initial Development Challenges 
The NMCI has experienced development difficulties and program revisions since 
development initiation.  The primary reason for these problems was the underestimation 
of the difficulty of program tasks.  As the contract nears completion in December 2010, 
however, performance has improved. 
Underestimating the difficulties of the NMCI became evident once the Navy and the 
contractor tallied the total number of legacy programs currently operating on Navy and 
Marine legacy systems.  Legacy programs that have been inherited often present 
compatibility issues after installing a new system.  Delays stemmed from the need to (1) 
undertake an extensive review to list and categorize all legacy applications, (2) develop a 
new strategy to digest the number of applications that were orders of magnitude larger 
than originally believed, and finally, (3) put the new implementation strategy into effect.  
As noted by one study, "it was initially assumed that the number of these [outdated 
legacy] applications was in the thousands. After contract award, the Navy and EDS were 
shocked to find the number was actually 100,000" (Jordan 2007).  The contract goal of 
transitioning legacy applications into 500 NMCI accredited programs was therefore 
revealed to be a much more difficult task than first thought.   
The NMCI contract was also complicated by the lack of centralized DoN management.  
The USN has traditionally operated with a relatively decentralized command structure, 
and deference to local commanders or officials has rendered EDS’ standardization of 
software difficult, if not impossible to achieve.  As EDS attempted to standardize 
software at over six hundred DoN installations, it inevitably rubbed shoulders with 
military and civilian professionals who refused to abandon legacy applications.  EDS was 
forced to fight the same political battles over software and compatibility issues again and 
again with separate officials at each DoN installation.  The lack of DoN management to 
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enforce what was actually a policy change in the DoN resulted in poor contract 
implementation.     
Security was another major concern that was negatively impacted by initial estimates.  
This concern grew more problematic following the events of September 11th, when the 
DoN put a renewed emphasis on this feature.  In order to provide "a smooth running, 
secure network, the security team must know which ports and protocols the applications 
use to communicate, so that when viruses or malicious visitors enter the network, they 
can be tagged as errant" (Jordan 2007).  As with applications, the contractor and the Navy 
significantly underestimated the complex nature of the DoN network.  Many deployment 
delays stemmed from the contractor’s needing to repeatedly test the network for 
compatibility and security issues.   
The NMCI has also suffered delays from underestimates of other portions of the program 
such as hardware refreshment, network capabilities, and evaluation of operation 
processes.  These problems mainly stem from underestimates of initial DoN capabilities 
and the massive scale of the project.  All of these setbacks further impeded EDS’ 
progress with the NMCI.   
Challenges and Progress 
By May 2002, only 4,000 seats had been cutover.  Due to NMCI’s slow progress, 
Congress, in December 2002, sought to strengthen oversight by requiring authorization to 
increase the seat limits beyond 60,000, and then up to 150,000.    
In 2003, EDS shareholders filed a class-action lawsuit against the company alleging 
security fraud stemming from second quarter losses, primarily due to “problem 
contracts.”  According to EDS, difficulties with the NMCI contract resulted in a $334 
million pretax loss on the program as of 2003 (Verton 2003).  The company cited “lower 
profit margins on NMCI seats and deployment delays” as reasons for this loss (Verton 
2003).  Subsequently, the DoN and EDS restructured the NMCI's contract and 
implementation schedule.  One report estimates that EDS losses averaged $800 million 
annually in the first years of the contract, totaling $3 billion (Jordan 2007).  EDS is 
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expected to recoup most, though not all, of its initial losses before its current contract 
expires. 
By June 2006, the NMCI had made significant progress. Approximately “303,000 seats 
were operational at about 550 sites”—a significant improvement over prior years, but still 
well below the initial estimate of about 415,000 seats by FY 2004 (Government 
Accountability Office 2006).   
Acknowledging the NMCI’s shortcomings , the Navy awarded a one-year $5.9 million 
contract to BearingPoint in December 2006 (halfway through the contract) to help 
manage IT services (Beizer 2006).  BearingPoint was awarded a larger 5-year contract, 
worth a maximum of $57.9 million in October 2007, principally to “design and operate a 
secure, battle-ready global information technology network for the Naval Network 
Warfare Command” (Hubler 2007).  This action solidified the subtle—if unofficial—shift 
away from the NMCI’s initial goal of information superiority (in the form of a battle-
ready information system) to simply furnishing the DoN with an operational information 
network.   
As of 2007, communication between networks remained difficult.  “[A] member of the 
Navy staff cannot share attachments with a Marine user.  Neither user can share 
attachments with users in the medical community” (Jordan 2007).  While much progress 
has been made, the lack of policy coordination and enforcement forced EDS to create the 
NMCI in a piecemeal fashion.   
As of December 2010, 387,000 seats have been transitioned to the end-state NMCI 
environment (HP 2010).  Moreover, customer satisfaction has risen substantially over 
time while the NMCI has provided the DoN with services approximately 15% below the 
cost of running its legacy systems (HP Enterprise Services 2009).  As early as 2008, 
several top Navy officers asserted that the NMCI “is achieving much of what we had 
hoped NMCI would achieve” (Kreisher 2008; Lawlor 2009).  The DoN has a good reason 
to be happy; after some unexpected delays, it ultimately had its strategic objectives for 




 Ambitious contractual objectives must be fully analyzed prior to the RFP, 
while progress must be analyzed throughout the contract.   
The DoN’s initial white paper underestimated the total cost of the contract by 
roughly five billion dollars, and the subsequent RFP underestimated the total cost 
by two billion.  Cost analysis failed to anticipate the challenges of legacy 
applications as well as numerous special requirements (e.g., Conflicts of Interest, 
enhanced security needs, large file transmissions, etc.).  The inadequate 
understanding of the requirements and EDS’ near bankruptcy in 2003 forced both 
parties to write a new contract that reduced EDS’ contractual responsibilities 
while increasing its compensation.  Proper requirements analysis is essential for a 
contract to be successful, and that analysis is not only needed before the awarding 
of the contract, but should be revised throughout the contract as well.  
 Programs need to fully understand their requirements in order to make the 
necessary performance, cost, and schedule trade-offs.   
The Navy emphasized the NMCI program schedule and the contractor delivered 
most of the services on time, but exceeded original cost estimates.  Because the 
DoN had not defined all of its technical requirements in 1999 due to the time and 
expense of doing so, it rushed the acquisitions process and increased the potential 
for cost growth.  Consequently, the Navy allowed vendors to perform site-surveys 
at Navy and Marine facilities, and offered to answer technical questions via e-
mail.  As a result, EDS did not realize the enormous number of legacy 
applications until it began work on the project causing the growth in scope and 
cost.   
 Firm-Fixed-Price contracts for high-risk, ambitious programs do not 
necessarily reduce program costs.   
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When the expected costs are well-known, and there is low risk of any changes in 
program cost, then Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) contracts can prevent cost overruns.  
FFP contracts are ideal when requirements are known and stable, and the 
technical risk is low.  For large, complex programs like the NMCI, for which 
requirements were not well defined, a Firm-Fixed-Price contract was unsuitable.  
The contractors initial cost estimates, in many cases, were no more than simply 
educated guesswork combined with much wishful thinking.  As a result, repeated 
renegotiations between EDS and the government resulted in increased levels of 
compensation for the contractor.   
 The DoD needs qualified and engaged technical experts to provide technical 
analysis.    
The DoN lost almost all of its organic technical capacity as it transitioned services 
to EDS.  Without that technical expertise, the DoN was not able to provide the 
effective technical oversight needed to evaluate the NMCI’s progress.  This, 
combined with unanticipated technical problems, like the number of legacy 
programs, resulted in delays and inefficiencies.  Better oversight is needed to see 
if cost overruns result from difficulties unanticipated by pre-contract analysis, or 
if they are a result of the contractor failing to provide its best effort.   
 Service programs need an effective governance structure. 
One major obstacle to the NMCI’s efforts to scrub or transition legacy programs 
to the new operating system was resistance from civilian and military officials.  
The NMCI had to support over six hundred different officials with different 
preferences and requirements, many of whom refused to relinquish their legacy 
applications.  The DoN should have tackled this policy problem on its own, but it 




 Before issuing an RFP, the DoD should consider dividing a large project into 
smaller, more manageable chunks.   
In order to be an effective fighting force in the future and fulfill its own stated 
objectives, the DoD must have efficient and streamlined IT services.  Given the 
size of the DoD, provision of these services will be some of the largest IT projects 
in the world.  Despite its need, the DoD must be aware that large-scale changes 
may not be feasible, given the immense scope.  Instead, the DoD should consider 
options for a more segmented approach to upgrading its systems.  For example, 
the DoN should have explored the opportunity to break down its NMCI contract 
into a number of smaller contracts that focused on specific areas such as the 
information network, hardware refreshment, and consolidation of legacy 
applications, as it did for the follow-on effort.  
 Metrics may produce unfavorable outcomes if consequences are not 
anticipated.   
Metrics and incentives, while helpful in highlighting government priorities, 
produced mixed results for the NMCI.  The metrics involving e-mail transfers and 
the percent of bandwidth used to provide connection to external networks 
provided EDS an incentive to severely limit the size of e-mail attachments, 
frustrating many who were unable to transmit larger files.  Metrics must be 
designed carefully with the expectation that the contractor will not make the same 
assumptions with regards to methods used to provide a service as the government.  
If the government had considered the problem of file sizes in e-mail attachments 
before designing the metrics, then it could have made its desires explicit in the 
RFP, receiving superior outcomes as a result. 
Next Generation Enterprise Network (NGEN) 
Next Generation Enterprise Network (NGEN) is the Navy’s IT services program that will 
be initiated at the conclusion of the NMCI contract.  Using the NMCI as its base, NGEN 
seeks to achieve the capabilities that the NMCI was unable to deliver.  Most importantly, 
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“the Navy is constructing a new acquisition approach that promises to give the 
government more operational control over the network” (Perera 2009).  Most 
importantly, the Navy will seek to employ multiple contractors as opposed to a single 
provider for all of the services.  The new contract will be segmented into five parts: 
Independent security operations oversight and assessment, Transport, Hardware, 
Software, and Enterprise services (HP Enterprise Services 2009a).  The DoN will be 
responsible for help desk functions formerly provided by HP, and it will exert better 
operational control over the decisions regarding the hardware, software, and network 
security.   
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V. Findings 
DoD needs to acquire services more efficiently and effectively 
Contracts for services make up over 50% of the DoD’s budget, and are critical to 
virtually all facets of military operations, and as a result, the more efficient acquisition of 
services is crucial.  The DoD has an additional incentive to reduce costs with the current 
protracted recession and as the impending mandatory entitlement spending increases.  
These factors will severely limit the growth of the DoD’s base budgets, and at the same 
time, the DoD will likely be unable to request additional funding through wartime 
supplementals.   
If implemented correctly, PBSA offers both the government and the private sector 
significant benefits.  The DoD secures the opportunity to acquire greater, and 
continuously-improving performance, at a lower cost than from its traditional contracting 
approach.  Further, with PBSA, the private sector service providers benefit as well.  In 
the words of one government contracting officer, PBSA offers what most firms want in a 
competitive environment: the “responsibility of performance to be theirs so that they can 
decide where they will invest their resources” (Wimmer 2003).  By placing emphasis on 
outcomes, firms have the freedom to innovate and offer what each deems “best value,” as 
opposed to competition for lowest cost based on rigid adherence to a set of contracted 
specifications and processes. 
DoD’s acquisition workforce lacks training and experience in services 
contracting 
Successful implementation of PBSA will require a significant transformation of the 
government acquisition workforce.  Few current employees have adequate experience in 
writing performance-based work statements, developing performance metrics, or working 
with their industrial partners at the level of collaboration required.  As noted, “the reality 
of performance-based contracting for the government procurement official is that 
responsibilities have not lessened; they have changed, and radically so” (Boykin 2005).  
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Even if given sufficient training, employees require time to understand and gain 
experience and confidence with the new processes and become proficient in their 
implementation.   
Additionally, in most cases, personnel that are performing program management 
functions for services contracts are not provided acquisition training, nor are they covered 
by the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) requirements 
(DAWIA, 1990).  These additional duty “program managers,” are ill-equipped to manage 
the often large performance-based contracts.  
Selecting correct metrics and contract incentives is paramount  
Selection of performance metrics is of utmost importance as metrics (1) indicate the 
government’s goal, (2) provide a mechanism to measure performance, and (3) create a 
means to incentivize the contractor to fulfill the stated goal of the program.  The “sound 
use of performance incentives is key to the success of the performance-based contracting 
approach” (Garrett 2002); that is, contractors are much more likely to put forth a best 
effort and innovative solutions if provided with financial incentives to do so.  Metrics are 
important in this regard, since “what you measure is what you get: the measures you use 
strongly affect the behavior of your managers and employees” (Kaplan and Norton 
1992).  Metric-based incentives not only encourage employees to achieve better results, 
but also enable directly-relating effort and assigning responsibility with outcomes.   
Given their importance, adequate time and effort are required to ensure development and 
selection of appropriate program metrics.   
Following the awarding of the initial contract, metrics and incentives can be adjusted to 
target more ambitious performance goals or focus on greater cost reduction.  As firms 
acquire more experience in providing a particular service to the government, they will 
learn new strategies for cutting costs and improving performance while maximizing their 
profits.  For large and ambitious projects like the NMCI, metrics and incentives can be 
aligned to reward the contractor for completion of progressively more complex and 
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difficult tasks.  Appropriate metrics and incentives are essential tools for implementing 
PBSA.   
PBSA requires competition to be effective  
Competition provides firms with an incentive to innovate and provide best value for the 
customer, while a lack of competition allows firms to charge above market prices and 
avoid introducing innovation.   
PBSA is most effective in markets that have a high level of competition.  "The chances 
for successful PBSA implementation decrease as competition in a service sector 
decreases" (Arcidiacono 2003).  Competition exists in most markets for services the DoD 
wishes to acquire, since many of the services are commercial in nature.  Moreover, 
performance-based contracting should lower the barrier to entry, so that the DoD will be 
able to expand competition in defense markets to more non-traditional firms.  For extant 
contracts, the threat of competition must be maintained, but only exercised if the 
incumbent is not continuing to improve performance and reduce costs.  Unnecessarily 
competing these contracts creates a disincentive for the firm to continue to make the 
investments necessary for these improvements.   
Post-award contract management needs greater attention  
The present acquisition system is almost exclusively focused on “getting to award.”  
Acquisition personnel are evaluated and promoted primarily on pre-award criteria.  In 
order to implement PBSA effectively, “it is crucial that agencies give considerable 
attention to managing the post-award contract administration phases” (Cavadias 2004).  
At present, the DoD does not have the information infrastructure required to undertake 
post-award contract management independently (Government Accountability Office, 
2005). 
Inadequate implementation can be worse than no implementation.  As noted by the Office 
of Procurement Policy’s Guide to Best Practices for Performance-Based Service 
Contracts, “application of only selected aspects of the total PBSC (today known as 
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PBSA) methodology is not likely to be successful, and can even cause a reduction in the 
value of services provided” (Office of Federal Procurement Policy 1998).  Failure to 
institute necessary changes could weaken current procedures without providing the 
framework necessary to achieve the superior outcome PBSA offers.  In this way, partial 
implementation of PBSA could lead to less efficient outcomes than the current DoD 
system produces.  For example, introducing performance incentives without effective 
competition is unlikely to improve performance and could lead to an increase in cost.   
More data and research is needed on PBSA  
Many PBSA contracts were implemented successfully and achieved the intended goals of 
the strategy: higher performance at equal or lower cost.  It is unclear from current limited 
information, however, whether a majority of PBSA contracts have performed 
successfully or not.  At present, it is even difficult to estimate the number of programs 
that have implemented PBSA. 
Without having a mechanism to measure the use of PBSA, there is no way of knowing 
how often PBSA guidelines are being used in the awarding of contracts.  In other words, 
there is no way of knowing how responsive the DoD has been to official changes in 
acquisition policy.  More information and analysis is needed in this effort.   
In particular, more research is needed on the effectiveness of partial implementation of 
PBSA.  Partial implementation of PBSA could lead to less efficient outcomes than the 
current DoD system produces.  Introducing performance incentives without effective 
competition, for example, is unlikely to improve performance and could lead to an 
increase in cost.  Yet, the limited research available suggests that many contracts have 
only partially implemented PBSA strategies (Government Accountability Office 2002).  
Failure to institute PBSA properly could spread PBSA use on paper while denying the 




Barriers to Effective PBSA Implementation 
There are several cultural, regulatory, and budgetary barriers that impede greater and 
more effective implementation of performance-based acquisition of services.   
Cultural barriers 
Organizations tend to develop significant procedural inertia, and as a result, fiercely resist 
change, especially when they must take on “new tasks that seem incompatible with its 
dominant culture”—as the DoD  must do as it transitions from providing services to 
managing contractors that provide services (Wilson 2000).  Some critics have gone so far 
as to argue that, 
 “experience over the years has convinced many observers that the 
fundamental shortcoming in the process has been and continues to be the 
failure of the acquisition community—from program managers to senior 
decision-makers and their advisors—to implement and carry out the letter, 
not to mention the intent, of the DoD’s existing acquisition directives and 
guidelines” (Christie 2006).   
More sympathetic observers note that aversion to instituting real change is, at the 
minimum, facilitated by the complexity of the issue and the inadequate action on the part 
of other important actors, including senior DoD leaders and Congress, to drive the change 
process. 
Effectively implementing performance-based acquisition of services will require a major 
cultural change with the acquisition community.  With traditional contracts, acquisition 
personnel wrote detailed requirements and specifications for contractors and then worked 
to ensure compliance.  With performance-based acquisition of services, acquisition 
officials are responsible for helping to define the desired outcomes, developing metrics 
and incentives, writing and evaluating performance-based proposals, selecting a winner 
based on best value, and then managing the post-award contract performance.  Although 
these tasks sound similar to “traditional contracting,” with performance-based acquisition 
they can be much more demanding and frequently outside the scope of most employees’ 
experience.  
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As noted above, the present acquisition system is largely focused on “getting to award.”  
Acquisition personnel are evaluated and promoted primarily on pre-award criteria.  In 
order to implement PBSA effectively, “it is crucial that agencies give considerable 
attention to managing the post-award contract administration phases” (Cavadias 2004).  
At present, the DoD does not have the information infrastructure required to undertake 
post-award contract management independently (GAO, 2005). 
The current DoD culture emphasizes regulatory compliance rather than successful 
outcomes.  The DoD acquisition workforce is not adequately experienced, trained, or 
staffed in effectively and efficiently buying/managing services acquisitions.  
Increasingly, services acquisition contracts are being administered by public servants 
other than acquisition specialists.  To the untrained contract administrator, cost efficiency 
may take a back seat to getting the service provided as soon as possible and to do so in a 
way that complies with current regulations.  Part of the solution should be to increase the 
DoD’s organic capacity for contract administration and to properly train the workforce, 
both professional and non-professional, in how to effectively administer contracts so that 
PBSA is implemented successfully.  Overcoming cultural barriers to successful PBSA 
implementation is critical to realizing better value for services contracting, and the best 
way to overcome cultural barriers is through effective workforce training. 
Regulatory barriers 
Most federal acquisition regulations and guidelines were written to balance a number of 
important political concerns.  Although economic efficiency is one of these factors, the 
other considerations typically—although unintentionally—undermine the most cost-
efficient methods of services acquisition.  For example, laws to prevent fraud have tended 
to unduly fragment authority and responsibility; the emphasis on “fair” competition has 
led to lengthy and extensive requirements in proposals, limiting the ability of contractors 
to innovate; and the promotion of socioeconomic goals has frustrated the government’s 
ability to receive best value from the private sector. 
Confusion regarding what is a service undermines more extensive use of PBSA 
strategies.  Many have noted that the “definition is not easy to apply, as a variety of 
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regulations provide different lists of what might be considered a service” (Ausink, 
Baldwin, Hunter, and Shirley 2002).  The same report noted that no less than 6 
regulations define and list activities that qualify as a “service,” and confusion and 
disagreement between the lists may be to blame for PBSA’s lagging implementation in 
the DoD. 
Part of the misunderstanding arises, as discussed above, from the shift in purchases from 
items to services.  Today, almost any product can be purchased as either an item or a 
service.  One example would be the change between purchasing an office printer and 
purchasing printing services—where, instead of purchasing the physical product, the 
government contracts with a company to install and maintain printers for a recurring fee.  
As the DoD continues to rely on service contracts, it must learn how to reform its service 
contracting guidelines to get better performance at a lower cost.   
Budgetary barriers 
The federal government budgetary process is complex, lengthy, and often produces 
unpredictable outcomes (Rivlin 1984).  These factors, along with the cascading effects of 
instability, undermine efficient acquisition strategies by inserting a variable level of risk 
into contract-awarding decisions, which can be particularly challenging when trying to 
establish the preferred, long-term relationships with service providers.   
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VI. Recommendations  
1.  Improve the DoD’s Implementation of Performance-Based Services 
Acquisition 
a. The USD(AT&L) must continue to reinforce the Department’s 
commitment to PBSA   
Successful reform—especially transformation of a bureaucratic culture—takes 
concerted effort over a prolonged period of time.  Top-level management must lead 
this reform to produce “buy-in” at lower levels.  To be effective, leadership must 
continuously communicate its vision and support its message.  Leadership should 
reaffirm its commitment to PBSA by issuing memoranda that stress the importance of 
using PBSA.  Leadership should follow up initial support by periodically issuing 
memorandum that update the DoD on the use of PBSA and its success stories.   
b. The USD(AT&L) should work to ensure programs maximize 
communication between government program personnel and service 
industry representatives 
Selection of suitable PBSA contractors is vital to implementing PBSA properly.   
“A contractor that will have significant impact on an owner's business 
needs to be selected much like a business partner. In fact, that is exactly 
what a strategic performance-based contractor will be - one who shares in 
the business risks and the business results or profits” (Cunic 2003).   
The DoD should encourage partnering with firms that demonstrate sufficient inherent 
capability and capacity, especially firms that have a proven track record with 
successful PBSA contracts.  Moreover, to achieve the best results, both contracting 
officers and the firm should commit “to a partnering philosophy that is centered 
around candor, win-win decision making, common goals, accountability, 
transparency, effective teamwork, elimination of redundancy, and lasting 
relationships” (Humphries 2003). 
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Developing and maintaining these kinds of relationships requires open and candid 
communications.  This interaction between government program personnel and 
service industry representatives is especially critical during the pre-selection phase, 
not only for market research, but also to help in the development of an effective 
statement of work and performance metrics.  Ideally this communication will also 
include one-on-one discussions, not just sterile “industry days.”  Timely and effective 
post-award communication must be maintained to foster the level of collaboration 
necessary for successful contract performance.   
c. The USD(AT&L) should provide clear guidance to the acquisition 
workforce on the appropriate contract structures for the different 
types of services   
Official PBSA policy “encourages and enables increased use of fixed-price contracts 
and incentives to encourage optimal performance” (Office of Federal Procurement 
Policy, 1998).  Commercial firms rarely use a contract structure other than fixed 
price.  These contracts clearly define what the purchaser expects in terms of both 
outcomes and costs.  In many situations, when requirements are known and stable and 
the technical risk is low, this contract structure can create an incentive for the service 
provider to innovate and reduce costs.  In other circumstances, such as when 
requirements are not stable, or when contracting for research and development, it is 
generally more appropriate to use cost-reimbursement contracts.   
d. For the different categories of services, the DoD and military Services 
should develop standards, definitions, and performance metrics 
To implement PBSA strategies successfully, the DoD and military Services should 
develop and adopt standards, definitions, and performance metrics for the various 
categories of services.  Use of these standards would reduce the often lengthy process 
of determining requirements, speed the acquisition process, ensure uniformity and 
consistency in the provision of services, and enable the aggregation of requirements 
and enterprise acquisitions.  Many services the DoD receives from contractors have 
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high-quality commercial standards.  Examples of these types of common services 
include facilities maintenance, information technology services, and provision of 
office supplies.  Private firms rarely deviate from the use of commercial standards in 
order to stay competitive in their respective markets (Acquisition Advisory Panel, 
2007).  To the extent possible, these commercial standards should be adopted, 
providing the additional benefit of reducing the barriers to entry for larger numbers of 
commercial firms.  Adoption of standard performance metrics across service 
categories will also facilitate more useful performance comparisons between 
organizations and contractors.  Finally, it is important to consider the cost of the 
required measurements, and limit the metrics to only those that are truly important 
and relate to the program’s objectives.  
e. Further research on the extent of PBSA use and how best to implement 
PBSA is required   
The DoD, as well as the federal government as a whole, have not undertaken the steps 
necessary to understand the degree of implementation and effectiveness of 
performance-based acquisitions.  Therefore, the DoD should undertake a systematic 
study on the degree of implementation and effectiveness, the cause and effectiveness 
of partial implementation, the challenges, and the costs and benefits of using 
performance-based service acquisition.  These results will be important to better 
understand the benefits of PBSA and improve its implementation in the future. 
2.  Improve the capabilities of the acquisition workforce performing 
services contracting  
a. Actively recruit experienced services acquisition personnel from the 
private sector 
In order to implement PBSA, the DoD needs a workforce that has the capacity to 
transition the acquisition system towards greater use of PBSA.  Although the DoD 
acquisition expenditures have doubled since 2001, acquisition workforce levels have 
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remained flat.  The DoD should hire more acquisition employees.  Although this 
would decrease the venerated “tooth-to-tail” ratio, improved acquisition performance 
could have large potential benefits for the military.   
b. Improve the training of government services acquisition personnel  
The DoD should also increase the training of its employees involved in the 
acquisition of services.  Training should emphasize “the importance of a robust 
requirements definition process… the need for clear performance requirements, 
measurable performance standards, and a quality assurance plan to improve the use of 
performance-based contracting” (GAO 2007).  To help create the desired professional 
community, the Department should develop a more formal certification for the 
individuals involved in the acquisition of services that includes requirements for 
training, education, and experience.  This will require the establishment of formal 
services acquisition programs and courses at the military academies, National 
Defense University, and the Defense Acquisition University.  This training, if it 
improves acquisition outcomes, would easily justify its own cost many times over. 
Further, although the DoD has issued a definition of service—a contract “that directly 
engages the time and effort of a contractor whose primary purpose is to perform an 
identifiable task rather than to furnish an end item of supply,” acquisition personnel 
are hesitant to implement PBSA as they do not have a clear understanding of what a 
service is (Department of Defense 2009).  The DoD should clarify current ambiguity 
with ample use of examples.  The DoD should emphasize that it uses a broad 
definition of service, with the understanding that almost any contract—including 
those traditionally acquired on a commodity contract—can be written as a service 
contract.   
c. The USD(AT&L) should incentivize the existing workforce focused on 
the acquisition of services   
The USD(AT&L) should make serving in the services acquisition career field 
attractive by ensuring that a process for career planning exists (one that includes 
 58
rotation with industry), and that there is an appropriate level of recognition and 
promotion for both military and civilian personnel in the services area. 
The incentive structure should also be altered to encourage acquisition personnel to 
ensure the government receives the contractor’s best effort throughout the entire 
length of the contract.  At present, the DoD acquisition officers are primarily 
incentivized for awarding a contract, not managing it post-award.  This environment 
is often described as a “getting-to-award” culture.  This culture exists because the pre-
award activities receive a great deal of visibility and attention throughout the 
program’s hierarchy, and typically result in greater recognition and reward.  The post-
award activities, on the other hand, are longer-term, and are considered a part of the 
daily routine—receiving much less attention and recognition.   
Conclusion 
The DoD could reap tremendous benefits—in terms of both performance and cost—if it 
is able to implement PBSA successfully.  Effective implementation of PBSA will require 
additional effort at all echelons.  Senior DoD leaders will have to work to reduce the 
existing barriers, as well as to transform the DoD’s acquisition workforce and  improve 
its information reporting system.  Despite these challenges, the benefits of PBSA far 
outweigh the costs.  The DoD must move aggressively to attain the best value for the 
taxpayers—affordable national security demands it. 
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Appendix A: 7 Steps to PBSA Explained 
Appendix A summarizes the Seven Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition 
guidebook. 
Integrated Solutions Team (IST) 
The core of an effective PBSA strategy is the creation of a team that is focused on 
achieving the shared mission.  These individuals represent all major stakeholders in the 
process.  The organization of the team should overcome any internal barriers to 
communication that tends to undermine other acquisition efforts, as well as clearly define 
what the purpose of the team is and what the goal of the project is.  When developing the 
overall goal of the group and the acquisition effort, the team must make sure to link their 
efforts with the agency’s overall strategy.  Importantly, the individuals should be 
empowered to make vital program decisions, as well as have incentives linking their 
performance to the outcome of the acquisition effort.   
Describe Problem 
The IST must first completely and accurately describe the problem the team faces.  Then 
the team must define its desired result, what result or set of results would constitute 
success, and finally determine the current level of performance to establish a baseline of 
performance that the project can be evaluated against (Interagency-Industry Partnership 
in Performance 2006). 
Examine the Market 
The team should next take the time and energy to understand the market.  This 
examination should include (1) discussions with individuals from other public entities 
that have experience in the private sector, (2) talks with private sector firms to understand 
their approach to the market along with their reasoning, and (3) an assessment of current 
government contracts.  These efforts should be well documented so that the team can 
refer back to this knowledge during later steps. 
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Two Strategies for Developing PBSA Contract Requirements 
A Performance Work Statement (PWS) and a Statement of Objectives (SOO) represent 
two different strategies to establish performance-based contracts.  Using the first method, 
the government develops the requirements document internally.  The PWS establishes, 
based on the IST’s thorough analysis of the market, what the agency desires, the criterion 
for effectiveness, and oversight provisions.  The PWS is then issued to the bidding 
contractor as a Request for Proposal (RFP).  According to the guidebook, the second 
method, SOO, “turns the acquisition process around and requires competing contractors 
to develop the performance work statement, performance metrics and measurement plan, 
and quality assurance plan” (Interagency-Industry Partnership in Performance 2006).  An 
SOO explains, in general, the purpose of the proposal along with the constraints so that 
the contractor can develop a PWS.  The winning contractor’s SOO becomes the basis for 
the contract’s official PWS.  
Performance Work Statement (PWS)  
A PWS is developed by conducting an analysis of the desired results of the agency, 
distilling goals down to the fewest number of reliable objectives, and then combining 
information known about the market to produce a single suitable document.  The 
document needs to define the desired outcomes, required services, performance 
standards, acceptable quality levels, required monitoring methods, and the contract’s 
incentive structure (Department of Defense Department of Commerce, Acquisition 
Solutions, Department of Agriculture, Department of Treasury, and the General Services 
Administration, 2006).  The key to an effective PWS—and what distinguishes it from a 
traditional requirements document—is to describe what is desired as opposed to the 
method by which the desired output will be achieved.   
Statement of Objectives (SOO) 
A SOO also begins with an analysis of the agency’s objectives and the market.  Instead of 
creating its own requirements, however, an SOO issues a statement that explains the 
purpose of the proposal along with the general constraints so that the contractor can 
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develop a PWS.  An SOO simply describes the scope of the project and the major 
constraints.  As mandated by the FAR, an SOO must include sections on purpose, scope, 
period and place of performance, background information, required results, and any 
operating constraints (Department of Defense Department of Commerce, Acquisition 
Solutions, Department of Agriculture, Department of Treasury, and the General Services 
Administration, 2006).  Given the relatively loose set of requirements, the IST must 
intensively collaborate with the contractors to ensure that the agency and contractor have 
similar understandings of the purpose of the effort. 
The SOO of the contractor that wins the contract will be converted into a PWS.  This 
document must contain all of the requirements of a governmental issued PWS. 
Select Measures 
After implementation of a PWS, special attention must be paid to selecting appropriate 
and effective measures.  The IST, in collaboration with the contractors, should determine 
a few high quality measures that convey important knowledge about the performance of a 
project without presenting an undue burden.  The guidebook notes, however, that special 
consideration should be given for cost, as “the team will want to determine that the cost 
of measurement does not exceed the value of the information... and that more expensive 
means of measurement are used for only the most risky and mission-critical 
requirements” (Department of Defense Department of Commerce, Acquisition Solutions, 
Department of Agriculture, Department of Treasury, and the General Services 
Administration, 2006).  To accomplish its goal, the IST should rely on commercial 
standards as much as possible.  The measures should also allow flexibility to adapt to 
different conditions as more knowledge becomes available during the course of the 
contract.  Measures must also link contractor performance with the goals of the agency, 
providing incentives for desired outcomes and penalties for failing to achieve provisions 
in the contract.  Finally, the guidebook stresses the importance of considering metrics that 
will foster a healthy relationship between the team and contractor, so that the two entities 
work together towards a common goal. 
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Select a Contractor 
Only after the other steps have been completed should the team select a contractor.  The 
guidebook notes that this is perhaps the most important step as “selecting the right 
contractor and developing a partnership automatically solves many potential performance 
issues” (Department of Defense Department of Commerce, Acquisition Solutions, 
Department of Agriculture, Department of Treasury, and the General Services 
Administration, 2006).  Proper selection involves down selecting from numerous 
competitors to one firm; constantly communicating with all contractors throughout the 
process; selecting contracts based on best value; considering past performance as a 
criterion; and considering ways to resolve potential conflicts of interest.  
Manage Performance 
The work of the team does not end with source selection: the government must actively 
manage the contractor throughout the length of the contract.  Although the post-award 
phase usually receives less focus than the pre-award phase, post-award management is 
“equally vital to business success” in both the private and public spheres (Garrett 2007).  
The best way to achieve effective management to is keep the IST together.  The IST must 
be appropriately adjusted, redefining its roles and responsibilities to properly manage the 
contract.  Moreover, the IST must be both accountable and have incentive to perform 
well.  To achieve the best management, the contractor should be added to the IST.  
Finally, the team must emphasize and utilize the best management techniques available to 
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